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The Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act in the Age of Globalization: The Need
to Amend the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act (FTAIA) & Vigorously Apply
International Comity

SAMUEL F. KAVA *©
Some may think it is an interesting hobby, others may call it a waste of money, but
the best term to describe my passion for collecting athletic sneakers is to simply say
I am a “sneaker-head.” Since I was 14-years-old I began collecting various Nike
athletic shoes, specifically Jordan’s and Air Force 1’s. While my passion for collecting
athletic shoes has been unrelenting, the method of my purchases has changed
drastically over the past 10-years. Rather than going to my local brick-and-mortar,
the majority of my purchases are now executed via the internet. E-commerce
platforms have depleted my territorial limitations and have allowed me to diversify
my sneaker collection. In addition, these e-commerce platforms have made me a
more educated consumer. Because these platforms are easily accessible and provide
transparent pricing, I can price shop and attempt to get my favorite sneakers at the
lowest cost.
While there are many benefits to e-commerce, and the benefits certainly
outweigh the costs, it is necessary to discuss the costs to ensure laws are in place to
protect consumers, producers, and distributors alike. Thus, one of the biggest
concerns with the paradigm presented above is: which nation’s laws will apply in
the event of dispute? The supply chain may include a Chinese manufacturer that
makes the shoe, a German seller that designs the shoe under its brand, an Indian ecommerce company that connects the German seller with various buyers, and a U.S.
consumer.
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The Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
This paper examines the complexities of choice of law, in this new age of
globalization, through the lens of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The Sherman Act was
enacted by Congress in 1890 to: (1) ensure economic competition, (2) provide new
businesses a shot at entry, and (3) prevent companies from extracting supracompetitive profits. Initially, the Act was limited to conduct occurring in the United
States; however, in lieu of globalization, courts began a gradual process of
expanding the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to any
situation that had an effect on U.S. commerce. Today, despite Congress’ attempt to
limit the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to only conduct
that has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on commerce in
the United States,” there are hardly any mechanisms to limit the extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Specifically, the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act (“FTAIA”) has become obsolete in the current age of
globalization, the Supreme Court does not take international comity seriously, and
there may be another expansion of the extraterritorial application of the Sherman
Act with the Supreme Court’s recent finding in Apple v. Pepper that consumers have
standing to bring anti-trust claims against Consumer-to-Consumer (“C2C”) ecommerce platforms.
This broad application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act has led many foreign
nations to enact blocking statutes. Between the breadth of the extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act and the conflicting foreign blocking statutes, the
choice of law uncertainty has been exacerbated and will certainly have adverse
economic effects on all stakeholders involved in the supply chain. Thus, this paper
further prescribes courses of action for all three branches of the United States
government to ensure e-commerce continues to excel and provide benefits for its
consumers, producers, and e-commerce platforms.
INTRODUCTION

In 1890, using its Constitutional power “to regulate commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States,”1 the United States Congress passed the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act.2 The Sherman Act, which is considered “the most important and
frequently enforced competition law of the United States,” was enacted to “curb
concentrations of power that interfere with trade and reduce economic
competition.”3 According to Lina M. Khan, a legal scholar at Columbia Law School,
Congressional intent to promote competition was not just for the benefit of
consumers but a means of “prevent[ing] large firms from extracting wealth from

1.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 210 (1890).
3. Donald E. Knebel, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws: Principles and Responses, 8(2)
JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. 181, 182 (Sept. 14, 2017). Sherman Antitrust Act, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/event/Sherman-Antitrust-Act (last visited August 19, 2019).
2.
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[both] producers and consumers in the form of monopoly profits.” 4 In addition, by
ensuring competition, Congress hoped “new businesses and entrepreneurs [would
have] a fair shot at entry.”5 While the goals of the Sherman Act are clear, through a
review of legislative history, “nothing in the Sherman Act or its legislative history
sheds light on whether the Act was intended or expected to be enforceable against
persons who committed the prohibited acts outside the territory of the United
States.”6
Initially, courts across the United States were skeptical that the Sherman Act was
to be applied extraterritorially—generally opting to apply U.S. law only when
transactions took place solely within its territory.7 However, after World War II
courts began to expand the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act to
conduct that had an anticompetitive effect on U.S. commerce. 8 While this expansive
application of the Sherman Act has its origins in case law, Congress went on to
codify the court’s view of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act with the passage of the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (“FTAIA”).9 The FTAIA was an express act
of Congress that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was to be applied extraterritorially to
any conduct that had a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on
commerce in the United States.”10 However, in an increasingly globalized market
nearly all transactions have a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect
on commerce in the United States.”11 Thus, because the test for determining the
scope of the Sherman Act has become toothless in the age of globalization, this
paper advocates for a more comprehensive analysis that respects international
comity. Specifically, this paper focuses on the adverse effects and potential
retaliatory response of the international community if the Sherman Act goes
through another iteration of expansion by permitting consumers standing against
Consumer-to-Consumer (“C2C”) e-commerce platforms that merely “connect
buyers and multiple sellers online.”12
4.

Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L. J. 710, 740 (2017).
Id. at 741.
6. Knebel, supra note 3, at 183.
7. Id. See also Russell J. Weintraub, Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and Securities Laws: An Inquiry
into the Utility of a Choice-of-Law Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 1807 (1992).
8. Knebel supra note 3, at 190. See also Peter Vanham, A Brief History of Globalization, World Economic
Forum (Jan. 17, 2019), http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/how-globalization-4-0-fits-into-the-historyof-globalization/.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Adam Levy, The 7 Largest E-Commerce Companies in the World, (Dec. 26, 2018) (explaining that a “C2C
e-commerce business [i.e. eBay] create[s] a marketplace to connect buyers and multiple sellers online…[it]
merely facilitate[s] e-commerce through their platform.” This compares to the traditional Business-toConsumer (“B2C”) e-commerce platform where “a business sells a good or service [directly] to an individual
consumer. . .[i.e.]
Walmart.),
http://www.fool.com/investing/2018/12/26/the-7-largest-e-commercecompanies-in-the-world.aspx.
5.

Journal of Business & Technology Law

137

The Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
E-commerce, which “refers to commercial transactions conducted online,”
connects local consumers with producers around the world. 13 Some of the most
successful e-commerce platforms include companies like: Amazon, Wal-Mart,
Alibaba, JD.com, Shopify, eBay, and Rakuten.14 Because of the expansive reach of
e-commerce platforms, consumers are no longer limited to their local brick-andmortar shops. As a result, e-commerce has become an integral part of consumer
life because it provides consumers with a convenient way to shop, enhances
consumer experience, and enables access to higher quality goods.15 By 2022, it is
projected that e-commerce revenue will exceed $638 billion in the U.S. alone. 16
While e-commerce has given consumers more purchasing options, and
corporations access to a larger market, the “direct, substantial, and foreseeable
effects” of trading through e-commerce platforms will certainly lead to an increase
in Sherman Anti-Trust Act litigation against e-commerce companies that are
incorporated and operated outside the United States.17 Not only will these foreign
corporations have a heightened fear of being criminally prosecuted, by an
aggressive United States Department of Justice, but these foreign corporations may
be subject to private consumer claims based on the recently decided United States
Supreme Court case Apple v. Pepper.18
Since 1914, when Congress enacted a complimentary statute to the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act, known as the Clayton Act, consumer’s had standing to bring private
anti-trust claims so long as they were “direct-purchasers” of the alleged anti-trust
violator.19 While the direct purchaser rule has become well-developed by the
courts, and would apply to traditional e-commerce platforms that use a Businessto-Consumer (“B2C”) model, the Supreme Court was only recently given the
opportunity to apply the direct purchaser rule to situations where a U.S. consumer
wanted to sue an online e-commerce platform that utilized a C2C platform. 20 In
Apple v. Pepper, the Supreme Court determined whether a U.S. consumer had
standing to bring a private anti-trust claim against a U.S. distributor who delivered

13. What is eCommerce?, ECOMMERCE GUIDE, http://ecommerceguide.com/guides/what-is-ecommerce/
(last visited Mar. 14, 2019).
14. Mayank Pratap, The World’s Five Largest eCommerce Companies, (Jan. 31, 2019),
http://hackernoon.com/the-worlds-five-largest-ecommerce-companies-8dd94dc22614. See also Levy, supra
note 12.
15. Consumers are Changing E-Commerce Preferences, MATERIAL HANDLING & LOGISTICS (Sept. 13, 2018),
http://www.mhlnews.com/technology-automation/consumers-are-changing-e-commerce-preferences.
16. Kaleigh Moore, Ecommerce 101 + The History of Online Shopping: What the Past Says About
Tomorrow’s
Retail
Challenges,
BIG
COMMERCE:
ECOMMERCE
NEWS,
http://www.bigcommerce.com/blog/ecommerce (last visited Mar. 14, 2019).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982).
18. Knebel, supra note 3, at 182. See also Apple v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
19. 15 U.S.C. §15 (a) (1914). See also infra Part IVa.
20. Levy, supra note 12.
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a good where prices were set by a third party.21 The Court held that consumers
who purchased apps for their iPhones through Apple’s App Store had standing to
sue Apple, a “Consumer-to-Consumer (C2C)” e-commerce platform, because the
consumer was a “direct-purchaser” from Apple.22 With this Supreme Court decision
there will undoubtedly be an increase in litigation against C2C platforms. 23
Specifically, regarding the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
there will likely be a windfall of litigation against C2C e-commerce companies that
are incorporated and operated outside the United States because: (1) the Clayton
Act would expand “direct purchaser standing” to consumers against C2C ecommerce platforms, and (2) there are no mechanisms to minimize the
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act against e-commerce
companies that are incorporated and operate outside the U.S. 24
Part I of this paper chronicles the Supreme Court’s changing view regarding the
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act; the Act’s current
extraterritorial application; and the international community’s retaliatory response
to the Act’s expansive use. Part II explains the main arguments that were heard by
the lower courts in Apple v. Pepper. Part III provides background to the direct
purchaser rule, which was established in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, Hanover Shoe v.
United Shoe Machinery Co., and Kansas v. UtiliCorp United Inc.25 In addition, Part III
discusses the narrow exceptions to the direct purchaser rule.26 Part IV analyzes the
adverse economic and political effects of applying the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
extraterritorially, and the need to expand the international comity exceptions as a
result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Apple v. Pepper. The paper concludes by
prescribing courses of action for all three branches of the United States government
to ensure e-commerce continues to excel and provide benefits for its consumers,
producers, and e-commerce platforms alike.
I.

I NTERPRETING THE E XTRATERRITORIAL A PPLICATION OF THE S HERMAN
A NTI-T RUST A CT

It is unlikely that the 51st Congress, which enacted the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, had
anticipated the Act to apply extraterritorially. However, in the age of globalization

21.

Apple v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
Id. See also Levy, supra note 12.
23. Daniel T. Fenske & Gabriel K. Gillett, Justice Department Urges Supreme Court to Resolve Scope of
Illinois Brick in Case with Major Implications for Tech Industry, Jenner & Block LLP,
http://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/18077/original/Antitrust%20Alert%20%20Apple%20v.%20Pepper.pdf?1527707234 (last visited Mar. 14, 2019). See also Andreas Rivera, What is
C2C?,
(July
20,
2018)
(discussing
the
growth
of
C2C
online
platforms),
http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/5084-what-is-c2c.html.
24. Levy, supra note 12.
25. Infra Part IVa.
26. Infra Part IVb.
22.
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it has become increasingly important to reconcile if the Sherman Act will apply to
foreign entities engaged in commerce with consumers both in the United States
and internationally. Over the past century—with vast improvements in technology,
transportation, and the execution of multilateral treaties—the United States has
seen an exponential growth in international trade.27 On a macro-level, with an
export industry valued at $1.547 trillion US dollars in 2017, the United States is the
second largest export economy in the world.28 On the other side of the balance
sheet, the United States sits as the largest import economy in the world with $2.408
trillion U.S. dollars of goods coming into the U.S. in 2017.29 While the sale of goods
and services via e-commerce platforms only accounted for 6.5% of the U.S.
economy in 2016; from 2006 to 2016 “the digital economy grew at an average
annual rate of 5.6%, outpacing overall U.S. economic growth of 1.5% per year.” 30
It is unclear how much of this growth occurred as a result of the emergence of
C2C e-commerce platforms; however, it is clear that the affluence of the U.S.
position in the import-export industry is a growing product of individual consumers.
LED TVs, greeting cards, plastic disposable gloves, cotton t-shirts, sneakers, cordless
drills, Christmas lights, leather handbags, are some of the many products that have
originated in foreign territories and made its way to American consumers through
the chain of distribution or manufacture.31 Thus, with the growth of e-commerce
and the deterioration of territorial boundaries, it has become increasingly pervasive
to settle the issue of which nation’s laws should apply in the event of a trade
dispute. Specifically, should U.S. anti-trust law be applied in a situation where a U.S.
citizen purchased a product from an Indian producer on a C2C platform that is
incorporated and operated in China? To help answer this question it is imperative
to understand the history of the extraterritorial application of the Sherman AntiTrust Act. Part I.A discusses the limited extraterritorial application that consumed
the courts throughout the early parts of the 20th Century. Part I.B describes the
case led expansion of the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
Part I.C explains Congress’ attempt to limit the overly expansive extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act with the enactment of the FTAIA. Part I.D

27. Bennett O’Brien, Four Major Ways International Trade Has Changed Over the Past One Hundred Years,
TRADE READY (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.tradeready.ca/2015/trade-takeaways/four-ways-international-tradechanged-one-hundred-years/.
28. Top 20 Export Countries Worldwide in 2017 (in billion U.S. dollars), STATISTA,
http://www.statista.com/statistics/264623/leading-export-countries-worldwide/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2019).
29. Leading Import Countries Worldwide in 2017 (in billion U.S. dollars), STATISTA,
http://www.statista.com/statistics/268184/leading-import-countries-worldwide/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2019).
30. Initial Estimates Show Digital Economy Accounted for 6.5 Percent of GDP in 2016, NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2018/initial-estimatesshow-digital-economy-accounted-65-percent-gdp-2016 (last visited Apr. 6, 2019).
31. David Yanofsky, Explore All $506 Billion in Goods that the U.S. Imported from China in 2017, QUARTZ
(Mar. 22, 2018), http://qz.com/1232833/explore-all-506-billion-in-goods-that-the-us-imported-from-china-in2017/.
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provides the current extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
which disregards international comity and is not limited by the FTAIA.
A. Territorial Limits of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act: American Banana Co.
The expansive extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is a fairly
recent phenomenon. Initially, the Supreme Court was skeptical to apply the
Sherman Act extraterritorially. The Court tended to uphold the “longstanding
principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.”32 Essentially, because Congress did not explicitly express that the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act should apply extraterritorially, the Court presumed that the U.S. law
“could not be construed to reach conduct outside the territorial limits of the United
States.33 The idea that a nation’s laws are “supreme within a jurisdiction but
generally powerless outside it” is referred to as the territorial principle. 34 The
seminal case that limited the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act was
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit.35 In this case, an Alabama corporation sued a
New Jersey corporation for violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.36 The plaintiff
claimed that the New Jersey corporation “with [the] intent to prevent competition
and to control and monopolize the banana trade, bought the property and business
of several of its previous competitors” located in Panama and Costa Rica. 37 Despite
both plaintiff and defendant being incorporated within the United States, the
Supreme Court held that because the alleged unlawful actions took place “outside
of the jurisdiction of the United States . . . they [are not] governed by the act of
Congress.”38
B. Expansion of the Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman Act &
International Comity
By the end of World War II, courts across the United States began “a gradual process
of reversing the holding of [American Banana] and expanding the reach of U.S. anti-

32. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 251 (2010) (citing EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 244, 255 (1991)).
33. Knebel, supra note 3, at 185. See also American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909)
(explaining “the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done”)
34. Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2448, 2455 (1999)
(explaining that the territorial principle was widely accepted by the courts throughout the early parts of the
20th Century, and received the endorsement of the coveted legal scholar Joseph Beale).
35. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 354.
38. Id. at 355.
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trust laws.”39 Through a broad interpretation of Congressional power “to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations,” and largely through judicial policy-making, courts
began to allow plaintiffs the opportunity to rebut the presumption that the
Sherman Act only applies within the territory of the United States by asserting
either: (1) Congress intended the application of U.S. law to a particular set of facts,
or (2) the particular fact pattern is not extraterritorial in the first place so that the
presumption is inapplicable.40
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America (“Alcoa”), established the modern-day test for plaintiffs
to overcome the presumption of limited extraterritorial application of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act.41 In Alcoa, the United States Department of Justice brought a
Sherman Anti-Trust Act claim against a United States aluminum company for
“monopolizing interstate and foreign commerce, particularly in the manufacture
and sale of [its] aluminum.”42 The United States Department of Justice claimed that
the aluminum company monopolized the market through its exclusive contracts
with international distributors. Despite the transgressions occurring outside of the
United States, the Court permitted the United States Department of Justice to
pursue claims under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.43 The Court explained “any state
may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct
outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state
reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize.” 44 Thus,
because the Court found that enough evidence was present to show the aluminum
companies actions affected the trade and the commerce of the United States, the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act applied regardless of the location of the transaction and
residence of the parties.45 More succinctly stated by the Southern District Court of
New York over 20 years after the Alcoa decision, “[t]he antitrust laws of this country
extend to any activity (unless plainly and clearly exempted by statute), whether
carried on by a foreigner or a citizen, which affects the trade and the commerce of
the United States.”46
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Second Circuit’s expansive
extraterritorially application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, in Hartford Fire
39.

Knebel, supra note 3, at 186.
Lea Brilmayer, New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and
the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 40 SW. L. REV. 655, 658 (2011)(explaining
that proving what Congress wants is a “thankless (and probably fruitless) endeavor; thus, most plaintiffs today
attack the presumption against extraterritoriality by asserting facts that show “the ‘focus’ of the substantive
law in question is something that took place in the United States”). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
41. Knebel, supra note 3, at 187.
42. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 421 (2d Cir. 1945).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 443.
45. Id.
46. Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Lmtd., 285 F.Supp. 949, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
40.
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Insurance Co. v. California.47 In Hartford Fire Insurance Co., a British Insurance
company was sued under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act by 19 states in the United
States for “engaging in various conspiracies aimed at forcing other primary insurers
to change the terms of their standard domestic commercial general liability
insurance policies.”48 The Supreme Court found that the facts of the case were
sufficient to rebut the presumption of territorial application of the Sherman AntiTrust Act, and that “this Court has repeatedly upheld [Congressional] power to
make laws applicable to persons or activities beyond our territorial boundaries
where United States interests are affected.” 49 However, the Supreme Court went a
step further and acknowledged that “a court may decline to exercise Sherman Act
jurisdiction over foreign conduct…by the employment of comity analysis.”50 Comity
refers to “the respect nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their
laws.”51 Section 403 of Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States provides a list of factors that a court may consider when deciding
whether to apply U.S. law or respect a foreign nations laws.52 The factors are
coveted to be “neutral criteria” that assist court’s in deciding “the law of the state
whose interest is clearly greater.”53 Some of these factors were outlined in Justice
Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Hartford Fire Insurance Co., and include:
[T]he extent to which the activity takes place within the territory [of the
regulating state]…the connections, such as nationality, residence, or
economic activity, between the regulating state and the person
principally responsible for the activity to be regulated…the character of
the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities,
and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted…the extent to which another state may have an interest in
regulating the activity…and the likelihood of conflict with the regulation
by another state.54
As expected, since Justice Scalia’s opinion came as a dissent, the Supreme Court
did not find that international comity barred the extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Act in Hartford. The majority opined that “[t]he fact that conduct is lawful
in the state in which it took place will not, of itself, bar application of the United
47.

Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
Id. at 764.
49. Id. at 813-14.
50. Id. at 798.
51. Knebel, supra note 3, at 198 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 817).
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(2) (1987).
53. Weintraub, supra note 7, at 1802.
54. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 818-19. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 403(2) (1987).
48.
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States antitrust laws, even where the foreign state has a strong policy to permit or
encourage such conduct.”55 Instead, the majority held that in order to bar the
application of the Sherman Act against persons subject to the laws of a non-U.S.
authority, the non-U.S. law must require the action being challenged so that
“compliance with the laws of other countries is…impossible.” 56 In other words, the
Supreme Court limited the defense of international comity to only scenarios where
it would be impossible to comply with both U.S. and the foreign nation’s laws.
Making the international comity analysis even more obscure, in lieu of the Supreme
Court’s Hartford decision, is the fact that “many nations share our faith in the value
of competition, and as of 2017, over 130 jurisdictions have enacted antitrust laws
as a means to ensure open and free markets, promote consumer welfare, and
prevent conduct that impedes competition.”57 Thus, it is unlikely that foreign
nations have laws that directly conflict with the United States law to the extent
where it would be impossible to comply with both nations’ laws.
While not expressed in Hartford, because the majority deemed international
comity was unfounded given the alleged facts, the Supreme Court has explained
that when evaluating international comity, courts shall not evaluate the legitimacy
of the foreign nation’s law and accept the validity of it under the “act of state
doctrine.”58 According the Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgement on the acts of the government of another, done within its
own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign power
as between themselves.59
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hartford is significant for two
reasons. First, the ruling affirmed and expanded the extraterritorial application of
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to situations where United States interests are affected.
Second, the holding narrowed a defendant’s ability to claim that international
comity should apply as a bar to the extraterritorial application of the Sherman AntiTrust Act. Specifically, the Supreme Court limited the international comity defense
to only situations where the laws of the United States and the foreign nation’s laws
are in such conflict that adhering to one law would per se make you violate the
other law.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
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Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 799.
Knebel, supra note 3, at 198–99 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 799).
Knebel, supra note 3, at 202.
Id. at 199–200.
Id. (citing Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
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C. Blocking Statutes & The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA)
The broad application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and the narrow exception to
barring the Act through international comity, led many foreign nations to enact
blocking statutes to “protect their nationals from criminal [and civil] proceedings in
[the United States] where the claims to jurisdiction by those courts [were] excessive
and constitute[d] an invasion of sovereignty.”60 Many of the United States’ closest
allies—the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, France, Italy, South Africa, the
Netherlands—enacted blocking statutes that:
[T]riggered the issuing of conflicting injunctions, [] given rise to a spate
of foreign statutes designed to thwart discovery in the United States
proceedings…[and] the most extreme example of outrage at the
extraterritorial application of our anti-trust law is the United Kingdom’s
‘Clawback Act.’ This statute goes far beyond simply denying recognition
to the United States decrees and permits suits in the United Kingdom to
recover any part of the judgement already paid that exceeds
compensatory damages.61
In addition, even U.S. companies opposed the broad application of the Act
because they felt it “handicapped [them] in competing for off-shore business
against foreign firms that were not subject to the strict antitrust constraints
imposed by U.S. law.”62
To quell the concerns of both foreign nations and domestic companies, the
United States Congress enacted the FTAIA. The FTAIA, which went into effect in
1982, provided protection for export transactions by “imposing additional
requirements for establishing a Sherman Act claim involving foreign commerce that
is not import trade or import commerce.”63 Specifically, in order to bring an antitrust claim, the FTAIA required “the conduct to have a direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect on commerce in the United States.” 64 In other words,
a foreign exporter would not be subject to prosecution under the Sherman AntiTrust Act if it engaged in an anticompetitive act (i.e. price fixing) that did not “have
a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on commerce in the United
States.”65 As is apparent by the FTAIA statute, corporations that are engaged in
import commerce are “unaffected by the FTAIA and remain[] subject to the
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Sherman Act.”66 Nevertheless, the FTAIA was a good faith effort by the legislative
branch to: (1) improve the nation’s international relations, (2) ensure U.S. domestic
companies were not disadvantaged, and (3) provide “a unified legal standard to
determine whether the U.S. antitrust law applies to foreign transactions.”67
D. FTAIA’s Failure to Withstand Time & International Comity Is Not Taken
Seriously
The FTAIA temporarily eased the concerns of both the international community and
U.S. based exporters; however, the legislation failed in terms of unifying the
standard to determine whether U.S. anti-trust law applies to foreign transactions.
The clause “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable,” has become a product
of “judicial interpretation…[which] has created significant circuit splits.” 68
Specifically, the word “direct” has been construed differently among the Ninth and
Seventh Circuits.69 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals “has interpreted the term
‘direct’ to require that the effect on U.S. commerce follow as an ‘immediate
consequence’ of the defendant’s conduct.”70 Conversely, the Seventh Circuit has
broadly “construed the term ‘direct’…to denote a ‘reasonably proximate causal
nexus.’”71 Nevertheless, as the global economy becomes more integrated the split
in the way courts define “direct” has become irrelevant.
Most trades that take place today have a direct impact that is both: (1) of
immediate consequence, and (2) the reasonable proximate causal nexus. Especially
with C2C e-commerce platforms, which serve to create “liquidity” in the market by
connecting sellers with many buyers, it is foreseeable that this platform will
proximately cause a multi-national transaction that causes an immediate
consequence to a U.S. producer.72 For example, if Alibaba were selling adidas
sneakers on its platform, at an anti-competitive price, Nike would be instantly
harmed because a customer (whether a U.S. or foreign citizen) will buy the cheaper
and similar product on the platform rather than purchase through Nike. This harm
is of immediate consequence to the Nike’s of the world, and Alibaba certainly is
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able to foresee it being the proximate causal nexus to this harm. Thus, the FTAIA
has become an obsolete and toothless statute in the age of globalization.
The United States Department of Justice has exemplified the ease of proving a
transaction has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on
commerce in the United States.”73 The success of the Justice Department has led to
its aggressive pursuit of criminal anti-trust claims against foreign companies
operating outside the United States.74 Since 1999, “about 90 percent of fines of $10
million for criminal violations of U.S. antitrust laws [] have been levied against nonU.S. defendants for conduct occurring outside the U.S. Twenty-eight percent of
those fines have been in excess of $100 million, with the largest, a fine of $650
million, levied in 2017.”75
Moreover, with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Apple v. Pepper, C2C e-commerce
companies that are incorporated and operated outside the U.S. will undoubtedly
be exposed to higher levels of private claims under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
These foreign e-commerce companies would be subject to the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act under two theories, either the e-commerce company may be: (1) defined as a
company engaged in import commerce, in which the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
automatically applies and FTAIA is irrelevant; or (2) viewed as a company engaged
in conduct that will have a “direct, substantial, and foreseeable effect on commerce
in the United States.”76 Regardless, with both the FTAIA becoming obsolete and the
Supreme Court’s potential expansion of standing for consumers to sue C2C ecommerce platforms as “direct purchasers,” litigation against foreign e-commerce
corporations will proliferate to the demise of the global economy. 77
While the international community has been slow to enact up-to-date and
effective blocking statutes, there will certainly be a resurgence by foreign nations
to adopt statutes that would limit the scope of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. For one,
with globalization making the FTAIA affectively obsolete, the international
community will strive to pressure the United States to adopt a new unified standard
that expressly respects international comity. Second, advances in technology, like
C2C e-commerce, will exacerbate the likelihood that the international community
will: (1) adopt new and effective blocking statutes, and (2) pressure Congress to
amend the current FTAIA to be more restrictive in its extraterritorial application.
Specifically, with Supreme Court’s decision in Apple v. Pepper, the international
community will look for ways to protect its e-commerce platforms from litigious
activity brought in the United States under U.S. anti-trust law.
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II.

P ROCEDURAL HISTORY OF A PPLE V . P EPPER

One of the most important value-adds to the iPhone, which occurred a year after
the release of the product, was the access iPhone users got to Apple’s “App Store.” 78
The App Store is “an internet site where iPhone users can find, purchase, and
download iPhone apps.”79 The applications offered in the App Store are intended
to enhance the iPhone user experience by offering applications that provide
entertainment, financial assistance, food and drink recommendations, health and
fitness directives, and more.80 When the App Store opened, on July 10, 2008, fivehundred applications were available to its users.81 Some of the apps released were
developed in-house by Apple employees; however, the majority of the apps were
developed by third-party developers.82 Initially, 25 percent of the apps available in
the App Store were offered to iPhone users for free.83 Of the remaining 75 percent
of apps, 90 percent were sold at a modest fee of $9.99 or less.84
In order to gain access to iPhone users, via the App Store, third-party app
developers had to pay Apple “a commission on each third-party app purchased for
use on an iPhone.”85 The arrangement between Apple and the third-party
developer worked akin to royalty payments: “[w]hen a customer purchase[d] a
third-party iPhone app, the payment [wa]s submitted to the App Store. Of that
payment, 30% [went] to Apple and 70% [went] to the developer.”86 In addition to
charging third-party developers in exchange for access to its platform, Apple placed
stringent user agreements on both third-party developers and iPhone customers.
To control the content in the App Store, Apple “prohibit[ed] app developers from
selling iPhone apps through channels other than the App Store, threatening to cut
off sales by any developer who violate[d] this prohibition.” 87 Similarly, Apple
discouraged iPhone users from downloading apps from unapproved platforms and
“threaten[ed] to void iPhone warranties if they d[id] so.” 88 Apple’s control over
third-party app developers and iPhone users led Stephen Schwartz, Edward Hayter,

78. Jason Snell & Peter Cohen, Apple Opens iTunes App Store, MACWORLD (July 10, 2008),
http://www.macworld.com/article/1134380/app_store.html.
79. In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litigation, 846 F.3d 313, 315–16 (9th Cir. 2017).
80. APPLE’S APP STORE, http://www.apple.com/ios/app-store/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2019).
81. Apple’s App Store Launches with More than 500 Apps, APPLE INSIDER (July 10, 2008),
http://appleinsider.com/articles/08/07/10/apples_app_store_launches_with_more_than_500_apps.
82. In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litigation, 846 F.3d 313, 316 (9th Cir. 2017).
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Eric Terrell, and Robert Pepper (“Plaintiffs”) to file an antitrust lawsuit against
Apple.
The Plaintiffs asserted two claims against Apple: (1) unlawful monopolization of
an aftermarket for iPhone applications in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
and (2) attempted monopolization of the same aftermarket. 89 The aftermarket
refers to the selling of apps to iPhone users, which the “Plaintiffs contend that Apple
ha[d] instituted…’an anticompetitive scheme to monopolize the aftermarket for
iPhone applications in order to control and derive supracompetitive profits from
the distribution of iPhone apps worldwide.’” 90 The Plaintiffs complaint centered
around the 30 percent commission that Apple received from the sale of third-party
developer’s apps.91 The Plaintiffs claimed that as a result of the “supracompetitive
30% fee” developers set a price that offset its high royalty fee, which subsequently
harmed the consumer since they were forced to pay an inflated price for the app. 92
Compounding the issue, the Plaintiffs asserted that Apple had controlled its
monopoly and ensured its profits by prohibiting consumers from shopping for Apps
on other sites outside the App Store in fear of voiding their warranty. 93 According
to the Plaintiffs complaint, “Apple ha[d] ‘cornered 100% of the distribution market
for iPhone applications’ and effectively ‘foreclosed iPhone customers from buying
software from any source other than Apple.’”94 As a result of Apple’s system, the
“Plaintiffs summarily conclude[d] that they have been injured by Apple’s conduct
because they paid more for their iPhone apps than they would have paid in a
competitive market.”95
On December 2, 2013, after hearing the case at hand, the United States District
Court of the Northern District of California granted Apple’s Motion to Dismiss on
the grounds that the Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring an antitrust claim. 96
Specifically, the Court found that the Plaintiffs lacked standing under Section 4 of
the Clayton Act.97 Section 4 of the Clayton Act, which will be covered in greater
detail in Part IV, requires the claimant in an antitrust claim to be “the first party in
the chain of distribution to purchase a price-fixed product.”98 Hence, “indirect
purchasers are precluded from suing based on unlawful overcharges passed on to
them by intermediaries in the distribution chain who purchased directly from the
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alleged antitrust violator.”99 While the United States District Court of the Northern
District of California acknowledged three, potentially four, exceptions that would
give an indirect purchaser standing in an antitrust violation; the court found that
“none of the exceptions applied to the Plaintiffs and the 30 percent figure for which
Plaintiffs complain is not a fixed fee, but a cost passed-on to consumers by
independent developers. As such, any injury to Plaintiffs is an indirect effect
resulting from the software developers’ own costs.”100 The Plaintiffs appealed the
United States District Court of the Northern District of California’s ruling on the
grounds that the Court “erred in characterizing them as indirect purchasers from
Apple, and therefore without statutory standing.”101
On January 12, 2017, the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the lower court’s decision and remanded the case back to the United States District
Court of the Northern District of California to be heard on its merits. 102 The United
States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed Section 4 of the Clayton Act using the
same criteria set forth by the lower court, and acknowledged that “the general rule
is that only ‘the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of
manufacture or distribution,’ has standing to sue.”103 However, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals used most of the opinion distinguishing whether Apple is a
manufacturer or producer, or whether it is a distributor. The Court explained that if
Apple is determined to be a manufacturer or producer, then the Plaintiffs would be
considered indirect purchasers.104 Conversely, if Apple is determined to be a
distributor from whom Plaintiffs purchased directly, Plaintiffs would have standing
under Section 4 of the Clayton Act to bring the antitrust claim against Apple. 105
Under this framework, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Apple was a
distributor of the iPhone apps, selling the apps with a thirty percent markup directly
to purchasers through its App Store.106 The Court reversed and remanded the case
back to the district court because it found that Plaintiffs were direct purchasers of
iPhone apps from Apple and had standing to sue under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.
Apple filed a timely petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States on August 2, 2017.107 In its petition for writ of certiorari, Apple asked
the Court to answer the question of “whether consumers may sue anyone who
delivers goods to them for antitrust damages, even when they seek damages based
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on prices set by third parties who would be the immediate victims of the alleged
offense.”108 The Court granted certiorari on June 18, 2018, and heard the case on
November 26, 2018.
III.

S ECTION 4 OF THE CLAYTON A CT : DIRECT P URCHASER RULE & I TS
N ARROW EXCEPTIONS

Whether a consumer has standing to bring an antitrust claim depends on if a court
classifies a consumer as a direct-purchaser from the alleged malfeasant. With few
exceptions, the Supreme Court has strictly adhered to a narrow interpretation of
the “direct purchaser rule.” Section III.A provides background to the direct
purchaser rule, which was established in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, Hanover Shoe v.
United Shoe Machinery Co., and Kansas v. UtiliCorp United Inc. Section III.B provides
a caveat to the direct purchaser rule, and articulates the narrow exceptions
recognized by the Supreme Court.
A. The Direct Purchaser Rule
The crux of whether a plaintiff has standing to bring an antitrust lawsuit centers
around the Courts interpretation of Section 4 of the Clayton Action, which states:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides
or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.109
The language adopted by Congress is broad and appears to provide standing to
“any person,” regardless of their position in the chain of distribution, so long as
some injury occurred because of an antitrust violation.110 However, over time, “the
Supreme Court has limited those who may sue for antitrust damages…[to] only ‘the
overcharged direct purchasers, and not others in the chain of manufacture or
distribution.’”111 This rule has come to be known as the direct purchaser rule.112
The first case where the Court limited standing to only direct purchasers was
Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery.113 In Hanover Shoe, Hanover Shoe, the
plaintiff, sued United Shoe Machinery for charging supracompetitive rates in
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violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act for the lease of its manufacturing
equipment. United Shoe Machinery claimed that Hanover Shoe had no standing
under Section 4 of the Clayton Act because it passed on its manufacturing costs to
its customers and did not bear the cost of the injury.114 Essentially, United Shoe
Machinery claimed that the only party harmed by its high leasing costs were the
customers of Hanover Shoe, who were forced to pay inflated costs for shoes
because Hanover Shoe passed the burden of its manufacturing costs by setting a
higher price on its goods. The court rejected United Shoe Machinery’s “defensive
use of pass-on theory” and held that because Hanover Shoe was a “direct purchaser
from the machine manufacturer they were injured by the full amount of the
overcharge irrespective of who ultimately bears the cost of that injury.”115
The Court rejected the defensive use of pass-on theory for two reasons. First,
the Court held that it is “virtually unascertainable” to prove that an intermediary
had passed on the costs of an overcharge to its customers.116 According to the
Supreme Court there are “[a] wide range of factors that influence a company’s
pricing policies…[and] a businessman may be unable to state whether, had one fact
been different (a single supply less expensive, general economic conditions more
buoyant, or the labor market tighter, for example), he would have chosen a
different price.”117 Second, the Court rejected the defensive use of pass-on theory
because, had it permitted the defense to United Shoe Machinery, it would be nearly
impossible for the customer to “meet the challenge that [the manufacturer] passed
on the higher price to customers.”118
Practically speaking, these difficulties will likely cause customers not to proceed
in litigation because they would only have “a tiny stake in a lawsuit and little interest
in attempting a class action.”119 Thus, “those who violate the antitrust laws…would
retain the fruits of their illegality because no one was available who would bring
suit against them.”120 As a result, Hanover Shoe was permitted to proceed on the
merits of its case against United Shoe Machinery because it was a direct purchaser
of the company and a prima facie case of an antitrust violation was asserted by the
plaintiff.121
Nine-years after Hanover Shoe, the Supreme Court developed the direct
purchaser rule in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois by rejecting an attempt of a plaintiff to
use the “pass-on theory offensively.”122 The State of Illinois, in its capacity as a
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purchaser of a building, initiated a lawsuit against a group of companies that
manufactured and distributed concrete bricks. The concrete brick companies, who
were allegedly engaged in a price fixing scheme, sold concrete bricks to a masonry
contractor. The masonry company then installed and built a masonry structure for
a general contractor, who then sold the entire building to the State of Illinois. The
State claimed that they overpaid $3 million for the building as a result of the price
fixing conspiracy between the concrete brick companies.123 Essentially, the State
asserted that the overcharge of the brick companies was passed on by the masonry
contractor, to the general contractors, and now to the State. Thus, the State wanted
to hold the first party in the chain of distribution liable for its antitrust violation
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.124
The Supreme Court of the United States rejected the State’s attempt to
“offensively use the pass-on theory,” and dismissed the antitrust claim on the
grounds that the State lacked standing as a direct purchaser of the concrete
bricks.125 The Court provided three policy reasons for its holding. First, “the
reasoning of Hanover Shoe cannot justify unequal treatment of plaintiffs and
defendants with respect to the permissibility of pass-on arguments.”126 Essentially,
the Court held that “evidentiary complexities and uncertainties involved in the
defensive use of pass-on against a direct purchaser are multiplied in the offensive
use of pass-on by a plaintiff several steps removed from the defendant in the chain
of distribution.”127 The more rigorous review, associated with the offensive use of
pass-on theory, would “clog the courts with protracted and expensive litigation.” 128
Second, “allowing offensive but not defensive use of pass-on would create a serious
risk of multiple liability for defendants.”129 By permitting an indirect purchaser
standing, via the offensive use of pass-on theory, the indirect purchaser would be
permitted to sue each party in the chain of distribution for the amount
overcharged.130 The multiplicity of lawsuits would “increase[] the possibility of
inconsistent adjudications.”131 Third, allowing indirect purchasers to piecemeal its
damages against multiple defendants (in this case the masonry contractor, general
contractor, and the brick companies) would “reduce the effectiveness of antitrust
laws by diluting the share of damages better-suited direct purchasers might secure
by bringing suit.”132
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The last Supreme Court case that sets the foundation of what is now known as
the direct purchaser rule is Kansas v. UtiliCorp. United, Inc.133 In UtiliCorp, customers
of a public utilities company initiated an antitrust lawsuit against a group of natural
gas producers for price fixing. The customers attempted to offensively use the passon theory by stating the natural gas producers “conspired to inflate the price of
their gas.”134 The chain of distribution started with the gas producers selling gas to
the public utilities company, and then the public utilities company would distribute
the gas to the customers at the inflated price. A similar lawsuit, claiming antitrust
violations of the natural gas producers, was filed by the public utilities company
against the natural gas producers.135
The customers conceded that they were direct purchasers of the public utilities
company and only indirect purchasers of the gas producers; however, they urged
the Court to allow for an exception to the direct purchaser rule and permit indirect
purchaser suits in cases involving regulated public utilities that “pass on 100 percent
of its costs to their customers.”136 The crux of the customers argument, to provide
an exception to the “direct-purchaser rule,” was that “[the] concerns in Hanover
Shoe and Illinois Brick about the difficulties of apportionment, the risk of multiple
recovery, and the diminution of incentives for private antitrust enforcement would
not exist in such cases.”137 Despite these compelling reasons for the Supreme Court
to disregard the “direct-purchaser rule,” the Court remained steadfast to its narrow
interpretation of the rule because it would be “inconsistent with precedent and
imprudent….to create an exception for regulated public utilities.” 138 The Supreme
Court explained that while “the rationales of Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick may
not apply with equal force in all instances, ample justifications exist for the Court’s
stated decision not to carve out exceptions to the indirect purchaser rule for
particular types of markets.”139 The Court dismissed the customers lawsuits, and
affirmed that the direct purchaser—the public utilities company—was best situated
to initiate suit.
B. Exceptions to The Direct Purchaser Rule
Despite the Supreme Court’s strict application of the direct purchaser rule, the
Court in Illinois Brick acknowledged that there may be two narrow exceptions
where an indirect purchaser would be permitted standing under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act to bring an antitrust claim. First, an indirect purchaser may have
standing when a pre-existing cost-plus contract between the direct purchaser and
133.
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indirect purchaser exists.140 The Court rationalized that an indirect purchaser should
have standing in this situation because “preexisting cost-plus contracts…make it
easy to prove that the direct purchaser has not been damaged” and the overcharge
was clearly allocated to the indirect purchaser. 141 Thus, the complexities that lead
to protracted and expensive litigation do not exist when a cost-plus contract is
present.142 Second, an indirect purchaser may have standing when the price fixer
owns or controls the direct purchaser.143 In this situation, “there is no realistic
possibility that the direct purchaser will file suit…and concerns with apportionment
and double recovery are inapplicable.”144 Nevertheless, these scenarios did not
present themselves in Illinois Brick and the State’s claims were dismissed because
they were indirect purchasers without standing. Likewise, these situations did not
apply in Apple v. Pepper.145
IV.

A DVERSE EFFECTS OF THE E XTRATERRITORIAL A PPLICATION OF THE
S HERMAN A NTI-T RUST A CT AND THE NEED FOR A MORE ROBUST
INTERNATIONAL COMITY A NALYSIS AND EFFECTIVE BI -L ATERAL
T REATIES

After the Supreme Court hearing in Apple v. Pepper, which took place on November
26, 2018, many practitioners and legal scholars anticipated that the Supreme Court
would hold that consumers have standing to bring Sherman Anti-Trust Act claims
against C2C e-commerce platforms that merely connect sellers with buyers. The socalled “liberal bloc”—Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan—all “gave
varying indications that they are inclined to find for the plaintiffs.” 146 Justice Breyer,
who appeared to simplify the chain of distribution or manufacture, implied that
“iPhone users buy apps directly from Apple, the alleged monopolist, and direct
buyers can always sue the alleged monopolist for an overcharge, even under Illinois
Brick.”147 However, even more compelling that the Supreme Court would find in
favor of consumer standing is the fact that Justices Gorsuch and Alito “both
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expressed a belief that Illinois Brick was either wrongly decided or no longer
relevant in the modern economy.”148
The pundits’ predictions were correct, and in a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice
Kavanaugh, the Supreme Court held that consumers who purchased apps for their
iPhones through Apple’s App Store were direct purchasers from Apple under the
Illinois Brick standard.149 The logic of the Court was simple:
[T]he iPhone owners are not consumers at the bottom of a vertical
distribution chain who are attempting to sue manufacturers at the top
of the chain. There is no intermediary in the distribution chain between
Apple and the consumer. The iPhone owners purchase apps directly
from the retailer Apple, who is the alleged antitrust violator. The iPhone
owners pay the alleged antitrust violator. [Thus,] the absence of an
intermediary is dispositive…[and] the iPhone owners are direct
purchasers from Apple.150
With this holding, consumers would presumably be able to hail C2C e-commerce
companies, which are incorporated and operated outside the United States, into
the United States for any alleged Sherman Anti-Trust Act violation. Thus, this
decision may exacerbate the already aggrieved international community, lead to
the enactment of more burdensome blocking statutes, and slow down the growth
of the emerging C2C e-commerce platforms. In lieu of these economic threats, the
current extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act needs to be
revised to limit its overly broad application. While the FTAIA was a good faith effort
by Congress—to improve diplomatic relations, ensure U.S. domestic companies
were not disadvantaged, and provide “a unified legal standard to determine
whether the U.S. antitrust law applies to foreign transactions”—it has become
obsolete in the age of globalization.151
Part V.A analyzes the adverse economic effects caused by the overly broad
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. In addition, Part IV.A
provides a Congressional remedy to combat the looming prospect that foreign
nations may be compelled to adopt more stringent blocking statutes because of the
Supreme Court decision in Apple v. Pepper. Part IV.B explains the importance of
expanding the international comity analysis in order to effectively remedy the
pitfalls of the FTAIA. Particularly, Part IV.B advocates that more factors should be
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used by courts when deciding whether to apply U.S. law or respect a foreign nations
law. Part IV.C concludes by acknowledging that bi-lateral treaties have assisted the
United States in enforcing the Sherman Anti-Trust Act against foreign companies;
however, greater cooperation and more detailed treaties could help facilitate even
more support for the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act.
A. Adverse Political and Economic Effects
Before the FTAIA was enacted, in 1982, many of the United States’ closest allies
were disgruntled by the U.S. courts’ expansive extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act.152 These nations confided in the territorial principle, and
believed it “axiomatic that in anti-trust matters the policy of one state may be to
defend what it is the policy of another state to attack.”153 The United Kingdom, one
of the most outspoken allies against the United States’ “attempt[] to impose [its]
domestic laws on persons and corporations who are not U.S. nationals and who are
acting outside the territory of the United States,” viewed the extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act as ironic given the fact “the United States
was founded by those who took exception to little matters of taxation being
imposed extraterritorially.”154 Thus, in an attempt to “protect their nationals from
criminal [and civil] proceedings in foreign courts where the claims to jurisdiction
[were] excessive and constitute[d] an invasion of sovereignty,” foreign nations
enacted blocking statutes to resist the extraterritorial application of the Sherman
Act.155
The blocking statutes of each nation varied, but all served to “block the discovery
of documents located in their countries and bar the enforcement of foreign
judgements.”156 The United Kingdom achieved these goals with the Protection of
Trading Interests Act, France with the French Blocking Law, Canada with the Foreign
Extraterritorial Measures Act, and Australia with the Foreign Proceedings Act. 157
The conflicting laws between the United States and its foreign counterparts created
tremendous uncertainty regarding what nation’s laws would be applied in the event
of a cross-border dispute. According to Nuno Limáo and Giovanni Maggi,
economists from the University of Maryland and Yale University, “as the world
becomes more integrated, the gains from decreasing trade-policy uncertainty
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should tend to become more important relative to the gains from reducing the
levels of trade barriers.”158
Essentially, for trade to prosper, it is more important to provide producers and
consumers with predictability and certainty (regarding the rule of law) rather than
enacting laws that focus on free trade economics. Accordingly, it is in the best
interest of governments to focus on unifying its laws before negotiating for the
elimination of tariffs or quotas. This is not to say that eliminating trade barriers is
not vital to the health of the economy—in fact, tariffs, quotas, and other trade
barriers are proven to adversely affect all parties involved in the chain of
distribution—however, it is more important to unify laws before focusing on the
elimination of any trade barriers.159
As mentioned in Part I.C., the complaints of U.S. exporters and foreign
governments were heard, and the United States Congress enacted the FTAIA “to
address the concerns of foreign governments that the effects test established in the
Alcoa case had not made clear the magnitude of the U.S. effects required to support
a claim under the Sherman Act.”160 Thus, the FTAIA was implemented to bring
certainty to consumers and producers by requiring that “conduct must have a
‘direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect’” for the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act to apply extraterritorially.161 This language provided the foreign community
with temporary relief, and gave producers and consumers the certainty and
predictability needed to establish confidence in the markets and continue trading.
However, since the passage of the FTAIA in 1982, the world has witnessed a
remarkable increase in globalization, such that most conduct that takes place today
has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” 162 on the U.S.
economy. Epitomizing the obscureness of the FTAIA, is the fact that U.S.
enforcement agencies—i.e. the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission—have taken an aggressive approach to pursuing international antitrust claims. In 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) published the International Guidelines—a publication
“explaining how the agencies intend to enforce U.S. antitrust laws against conduct
occurring outside the United States.”163 The International Guidelines have taken the
broadest approach in determining if conduct is “direct”—finding if there is a
“reasonably proximate causal nexus between the conduct and the effect” conduct
is “direct”—and the narrowest view that international comity bars enforcement of
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U.S. antitrust laws only when it is impossible for the actor to comply with both U.S.
law and its foreign nation’s law.164 Thus, because the FTAIA has become ineffective
and there is a risk of further expansion of the extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act with Apple v. Pepper, foreign nations will almost certainly
strive to adopt modern and effective blocking statutes. These blocking statutes will
revitalize uncertainty in the markets, and the global economy will be adversely
affected.
In addition, because our world is more integrated, compared to the time when
the FTAIA was implemented, the adverse economic effects may be worse if foreign
nations pursue modern blocking statutes. To hedge against judicial uncertainty,
corporations will likely react by hiring more robust legal teams. By re-allocating
money to legal costs, with the hopes of avoiding potential litigation and ensuring
compliance with all nations’ laws, corporations would have foregone the
opportunity to spend time and money on: (1) scaling its current line of products
(which would decrease the price of goods for consumers), (2) enhancing the
capabilities of its current line of products (which improve consumer capabilities and
increase corporate profits), or (3) creating new and innovative products (which
would benefit both consumers and producers). Thus, because corporations would
be forced to spend more resources on avoiding litigation rather than research and
development with the new blocking statutes, consumers, producers, distributors,
and the economy as a whole will be adversely affected.
Overall, there is a significant risk that foreign nations will look towards blocking
statutes to limit the extraterritorial application of the Act. The conflicting laws of
the United States and international community will lead to judicial uncertainty,
which will have an adverse impact on the global economy. Businesses will spend
more time and money to avoid disputes; thus, undermining corporate profits, a
customer’s ability to purchase low cost goods, and the overall health of the global
economy. The only certainty is that trade will slow down as a result of trade policy
uncertainty. To avoid these adverse economic effects, it would be advantageous for
the United States Congress to amend the FTAIA in a way that limits the effects of
the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Specifically, Congress
should limit the effects of the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act by expressly providing courts with a robust international comity analysis.
B. International Comity Test
As was discussed in Part I.B., comity refers to “the respect nations afford each other
by limiting the reach of their laws.”165 Prior to the Supreme Court case Hartford Fire
Insurance Co., which narrowed the comity analysis to only situations where it would
be impossible for a foreign entity to comply with both U.S. and foreign nation’s laws,
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federal courts considered a host of factors to determine if the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act was barred from applying extraterritorially. Section 403 of Restatement (Third)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States provides eight factors a court
should consider when deciding whether “a state may [or may] not exercise
jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections
with another state.”166 These eight factors include: (1) the link of the activity to the
territory of the regulating state; (2) the connection between the regulating state
and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated; (3) the
character, importance, extent, and degree of importance of the regulation to the
regulating state; (4) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected
or hurt by the regulation; (5) the importance of the regulation to the international
political, legal, or economic system; (6) the extent to which the regulation is
consistent with the traditions of the international system; (7) the extent to which
another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and (8) the likelihood
of conflict with regulation by another state.167
Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion in Hartford Fire Insurance Co., highlighted
many of these factors and determined that international comity barred the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act’s extraterritorial application in that case.168 However, the
majority decided to narrow the comity analysis by only considering if “the non-U.S.
law must require the action being challenged so that ‘compliance with the laws of
both countries is…impossible.’”169 This narrow comity analysis has led to the
broadening of the Sherman Anti-Trust Acts extraterritorial application, which
jeopardizes the economic well-being of the global economy. While some courts
have disregarded the Supreme Court’s narrow comity analysis, by claiming that the
Supreme Court “left unclear whether it was saying that the only relevant comity
factor in that case was conflict with foreign law…or whether the Court was more
broadly rejecting balancing of comity interests in any case where there is no true
conflict,” Congress should expressly provide federal courts with a broad range of
factors it should consider to ensure the United States respects the laws of other
nations.170 Specifically, Congress should amend the FTAIA by explicitly providing
that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act only applies extraterritorially in cases where it does
not offend the sovereignty of a foreign nation.
In essence, to ensure the economic prosperity of the global economy, the United
States Congress should be proactive in amending the FTAIA. Specifically, Congress
should prescribe a broad international comity test for courts to consider when
deciding if the Sherman Anti-Trust Act should apply extraterritorially. If
international comity is taken seriously, unlike its most recent application by the
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Supreme Court in Hartford Fire Insurance Co., there will be a greater degree of
compliance by the international community and more certainty will be provided to
consumers and producers. Moreover, federal courts should not wait until Congress
amends the FTAIA. In fact, federal courts should, on its own accord, extensively
apply an international comity analysis to every case where a foreign entity is
involved. As was previously mentioned, some courts continue to apply a robust
international comity analysis. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Mujica v. Airscan Inc. considered:
[T]he location of the conduct in question, the nationality of the parties, the
character of the conduct in question, the foreign policy interests of the United
States, any public policy interests, the strength of the foreign governments’
interests, and the adequacy of the alternative forum. 171
Thus, until the United States Congress takes the necessary step to amend the
FTAIA, federal courts should consider applying an international comity analysis to
all cases that involve an international entity. By adopting a broad international
comity analysis: (1) foreign nations would be less likely to adopt burdensome
blocking statutes, (2) consumers and producers would have more certainty through
unified laws, (3) the global economy will continue to prosper because of the
certainty and predictability of the law, and (4) foreign nations may become more
amenable to enter into bi-lateral treaties with the United States.
C. Bi-Lateral Treaties
While beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note that the United States
has attempted to use bi-lateral agreements to enhance international cooperation
with the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. In 1982, the
United States and Australia signed the Agreement on Cooperation in Antitrust
Matters “to minimize jurisdictional conflicts.”172 In 1991, “the United States and the
EU reached an antitrust cooperation agreement that commits the parties to notify
each other of imminent enforcement action, to share relevant information, and
consult on potential policy changes.”173 In addition, “similar arrangements have
been made between the United States and Canada.”174 Nevertheless, the provisions
of these agreements provide that “U.S. courts are not a proper institution to
balance interests of concerned countries within the context of private antitrust
litigation…[and may require] the Government of the United States to participate in
the litigation.”175 Given what was asserted in this paper, these bi-lateral treaties
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have had little effect in: (1) limiting the extraterritorial application of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act, and (2) gaining international cooperation.
However, if the United States Congress amends the FTAIA to ensure a broad
international comity analysis is applied and/or the federal courts begin to take
international comity more seriously, the international community may become
more amenable to accepting the extraterritorial application of the Sherman AntiTrust Act. The Executive Branch would have the opportunity to negotiate bi-lateral
treaties that advocate for unified laws. The President of the United States, using the
presidential power granted under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, could “propose and
chiefly negotiate agreements” that provide certainty regarding what nations laws
will apply if a cross-border dispute were to arise. Thus, the President of the United
States should attempt to negotiate bi-lateral treaties that advocate for unified laws
with the intent of: (1) providing certainty and predictability to consumers and
producers, and (2) achieving international support on the extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. After negotiating these bi-lateral
agreements, the President of the United States should fast track the proposal for
Congressional approval to avoid “regular legislative procedures…[that] can be time
consuming.”176
C ONCLUSION : BI-L ATERAL T REATIES AND N EW COMITY OF N ATIONS T EST

Overall, technological advances have enabled the exponential growth of the global
economy. While producers and consumers have largely benefited from
globalization, the contradictory laws between trading nations has created judicial
uncertainty that may lead to adverse economic effects. The United States’
aggressive pursuit of applying the Sherman Anti-Trust Act extraterritorially has led
many foreign nations to adopt blocking statutes. These blocking statutes, while they
were dormant for a period of time after the FTAIA was enacted, will have a
resurgence following the further depletion of territorial boundaries with
globalization. Specifically, because all conduct today has a “direct, substantial, and
foreseeable impact on U.S. commerce,” the FTAIA does not limit the extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act. Furthermore, in lieu of the Hartford Fire Insurance
Co. case, courts have narrowed the ability of defendants to bar the extraterritorial
application of the U.S. anti-trust laws to only situations where compliance with U.S.
law and foreign law would be impossible.
The Sherman Act is likely to expand its extraterritorial reach, yet again, based on
the outcome of the Apple v. Pepper case.177 To avoid an economic lull, all three
branches of the United States government need to work diligently to find solutions
that provide: (1) consumers and producers with certainty and predictability as to
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the law that will be applied with cross-border transactions, (2) foreign nations with
confidence that the federal courts within the United States will respect the
sovereignty of its nation, and (3) its citizens with assurance that they will not be
victims of large corporations seeking supra-competitive profits. To achieve these
goals, the United States Congress must amend the FTAIA to include a
comprehensive international comity test that requires courts to balance the
interests of all stakeholders. The federal courts of the United States, on its own
accord, should begin to take the international comity analysis more seriously and
apply it rigorously in all cases that involve cross-border transactions. Last, the
President of the United States, in an effort to gain international support and avoid
a resurrection of blocking statutes, needs to negotiate bi-lateral treaties that are
more detailed and provide mechanisms for the extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
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